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Preface
This  dissertation  is  organized  in  two  essays.  The  first  essay  tests  the 
“experience recommendation,” which is the widespread idea that individuals would 
be  happier  by  investing  their  money  in  experiential  purchases,  rather  than  in 
material  purchases.  It  also  tests  moderators  of  the  experience  recommendation, 
namely valence of the outcome and individual levels of materialism.
The second essay explores the underlying mechanisms of the effects found in 
the first essay. It explores the role of hedonic adaptation on the effect of purchase 
type  (material  vs.  experiential  purchases)  and  outcome  valence  on  consumer 
happiness. It also explores the role of memory as a possible cause for a difference in 
hedonic  adaptation  rates  for  experiential  and  material  purchases.  Finally,  the 
second essay presents data on the  difference between predicted and experienced 
hedonic adaptation for different purchase types.
Portions of  the first essay (experiments three and four) and of  the second 
essay (experiment one) will  appear at the Journal of  Consumer Research,  in the 
August 2009 issue, under the title “Happiness for Sale: Do Experiential Purchases 
Make Consumers Happier than Material Purchases?, ” co-authored by Julie R. Irwin 
and Joseph K. Goodman.
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Previous  theories  have  suggested  that  consumers  will  be  happier  if  they 
spend their money on experiences such as travel as opposed to material possessions 
such as automobiles. I test this experience recommendation and show that it may be 
misleading  in  its  general  form.  Valence  of  the  outcome  significantly  moderates 
differences in respondents’  reported retrospective happiness with material  versus 
experiential  purchases.  For  purchases  that  turned  out  positively,  experiential 
purchases lead to more happiness than do material purchases, as the experience 
recommendation  suggests.  However,  for  purchases  that  turned  out  negatively, 
experiences  have  no  benefit  over  (and,  for  some  types  of  consumers,  induce 
significantly less happiness than) material possessions. I provide evidence that this 
purchase type by valence interaction is driven by the fact that consumers adapt 
more slowly to experiential purchases than to material purchases, leading to both 
vii
greater happiness and greater unhappiness for experiential purchases. Moreover, I 
show that this difference in hedonic adaptation rates for material and experiential 
purchases is being, at least partially,  driven by a difference in memory for those 
types of purchases. I also show that individuals mispredict hedonic adaptation rates 
for material and experiential purchases. Finally, I discuss implications for consumer 
choice.
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FIRST ESSAY – HAPPINESS FOR SALE: DO EXPERIENTIAL 
OR MATERIAL PURCHASES LEAD TO GREATER CONSUMER 
HAPPINESS?
Chapter 1.1: Introduction
Psychologists (e.g., Gilbert 2006; Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz 1999; Van 
Boven and Gilovich 2003), economists (e.g., Frank 1985; Veenhoven 1993) and public 
policy  theorists  (e.g.,  Easterlin  2003)  have  become  increasingly  interested  in 
measuring  and  understanding  human  happiness.  For  psychologists,  research  on 
happiness has proved revolutionary because an overfocus on negative clinical states 
had omitted the positive range of human experience by focusing on what decreases 
pathology as opposed to what increases well-being (e.g., Aspinwall and Staudinger 
2003; Seligman 2002). For economists, happiness provides a useful comprehensive 
construct with which to analyze human welfare because,  “everybody wants to be 
happy. There is probably no other goal in life that commands such a high degree of 
consensus (Frey and Stutzer 2002, vii).” Consumer researchers have a stake in both 
of these general aims, as well. When considering the transformation of consumers 
through purchasing (Mick 2006) it makes sense to consider not only what leads to 
consumer downfall (debt, drug addiction, etc.) but also what leads to an especially 
happy  life.  As  with  economics,  consumer  research  can  become  overly  atomized, 
measuring the  effects  of  particular  consumption episodes without  a  sense of  the 
larger picture of where these episodes lead in the long run.
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The specific topics addressed across happiness research have covered a wide 
range,  from  precise  neurological  mapping  (LeDoux  and  Armony  1999)  to  cross-
cultural survey-based policy recommendations (Veenhoven 1993). Some of the most 
compelling recent work on happiness addresses the issue I address in this essay: the 
effect of particular human behaviors on subsequent happiness. This research has 
focused on issues  such as religious activities  and exercise (Mochon,  Norton,  and 
Ariely  2008),  marriage  and  family  experiences  (Easterlin  2003),  and  gratitude 
(Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, and Schkade 2005).
However,  there  has  not  been  much  experimental  exploration  of  an  issue 
primary to consumer theory: how particular purchases affect happiness. As I detail 
later in the essay, this gap in the literature may be due to a surprising agreement 
among theorists on this issue. Perhaps the theory has proved so convincing that 
experimentalists saw no need to test it. Dating as early as Hume (1975/1737) and 
through Scitovsky (1976) and Frank (1985), the sentiment has been that individuals 
will be happier if they spend their money on experiences (e.g., theatre, concerts and 
vacations)  as  opposed  to  material  purchases  (e.g.,  fancy  cars,  bigger  houses, 
gadgets). I term this the “experience recommendation.” 
There  is  only  one  published  empirical  test  of  this  experience 
recommendation.  Van  Boven  and  Gilovich  (2003),  using  a  number  of  clever 
experiments, found that their respondents did derive more happiness from positive 
experiential purchases when compared to positive material purchases. My essay is 
an expansion of this long-overdue experimental treatment of this issue. 
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In four experiments I affirm Van Boven and Gilovich’s (2003) findings, but 
show that their results are limited to positive purchases. For negative purchases, 
experiences  have  no  advantage  over  material  goods,  and  sometimes  material 
purchases  even  induce  more  happiness  than do  experiences,  the  opposite  of  the 
experience recommendation. I provide evidence that the experiences versus material 
goods distinction (as opposed to some other correlated variables) is underlying my 
results. For instance, a well-tested materialism scale moderates the findings in both 
my third and fourth experiments.
Moreover, I propose that individuals adapt slower to experiential purchases, 
when  compared  to  material  purchases.  This  differential  in  adaptation  rates  for 
experiential  and  material  purchases  is  a  possible  underlying  mechanism for  my 
effects. Because individuals adapt more slowly to experiential purchases, adaptation 
leads  to  both  lower  (for  negative  purchases)  and  higher  (for  positive  purchases) 
levels of retrospective happiness for experiential versus material purchases. I test 
this proposition in my second essay.
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Chapter 1.2: Theoretical Background
WHAT IS HAPPINESS AND HOW DOES PURCHASING AFFECT IT?
I  use  the  terms  “happiness”  and  “subjective  well-being”  (Diener  1984) 
interchangeably.  Other  researchers  (e.g.,  Frank  1999;  Seligman  2002)  have 
established that these terms are strongly interrelated and that ratings of happiness 
correlate highly with other measures of both psychological and physiological well-
being (e.g., Sutton and Davidson 1997). Although measures of subjective well-being 
sometimes include other affective and cognitive components (e.g. satisfaction with 
life;  Pavot  and  Diener  1993),  happiness  explains  most  of  the  variance  in  the 
subjective well-being construct (Compton et al. 1996). 
Diener (1984) suggests that definitions of happiness can fall into one of three 
categories. First, happiness can be defined by an external criterion, such as virtue or 
holiness, often sought but seldom attained. Second, happiness can be the result of a 
comparison between different criteria for a good life (e.g.,  education, housing and 
health)  and  a  person’s  current  situation.  This  definition  is  more  commonly 
associated  with  satisfaction  with  life  and  it  is  often  referred  to  as  a  cognitive 
component of happiness (Schimmack 2008). Third, happiness can be viewed as the 
preponderance of positive affect over negative affect. Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener 
(2005)  also  define  happiness  in  a  similar  way,  as  a  long-term  propensity  to 
frequently experience positive emotions. This last perspective is also consonant with 
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Layard’s (2005) account of happiness being similar to “feeling good”, enjoying life 
and wanting the feeling to be maintained. The contrary, unhappiness, is feeling bad 
and wishing things were different.
The definition of happiness employed in my research is aligned with Diener’s 
(1984) third category. Specifically, I address happiness as a sense that life is good 
(Myers  1992),  that  life  contains  many  positive  situations  and  emotions  (Ahuvia 
2007; Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener 2005). This view of happiness has received the 
most attention in the literature and is consistent with interpretations of happiness 
used in previous research (e.g., Van Boven and Gilovich 2003; Gilbert 2006).  
Happiness  is  measurable,  predictable,  and  comparable  across  contexts 
(Diener 1984; Diener et al. 1999; Gilbert 2006; Layard 2005). Researchers typically 
measure happiness by asking people how happy they are (see Kahneman et al. 1999 
for many examples) or how happy they are with a particular situation (Raghunathan 
and Irwin 2001) using multi-item scales. 
On the relationship between consumption and happiness,  Scitovsky (1976) 
suggested some years ago that purchasing may have a negative impact on happiness 
because consumers often buy “joyless” material possessions such as houses and cars, 
resulting in comfort but not pleasure. Likewise, Easterlin (2003) has proposed that 
investment in “pecuniary” market objects has no effect on happiness. In his essay 
“How  Not  to  Buy  Happiness”  (2004)  Robert  Frank  echoes  these  sentiments  by 
recommending against the accumulation of  “conspicuous goods” in the pursuit  of 
happiness. 
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Most of the writers who discuss the negatives of material goods nevertheless 
do suggest that some types of purchases may increase happiness. Scitovsky (1976) 
argues for cultural experiences such as vacations and concerts to provide pleasure. 
Thought  exercises  based  on  adaptation  studies  argue  that  consumers  might  be 
happier trading their material wealth (e.g., a percentage of the square footage of 
their house) for a more pleasant day-to-day lifestyle (e.g., a more pleasant commute) 
and  more  enjoyable  experiences  throughout  the  year  (e.g.,  more  vacation  time; 
Frank 1999). In his book, Jonathan Haidt (2006, 101) suggests that people should, 
“accumulate less, and ‘consume’ more … vacations, and other enjoyable activities.” 
In other words, there is a suggestion that purchases of material goods (e.g., cars, 
houses, furniture) should, overall, lead to less happiness compared to purchases of 
experiential goods (e.g., vacations, concerts, sporting events). I call this suggestion 
the experience recommendation. Besides appearing in the writings outlined above, 
this  recommendation  has  been  established  empirically  (Van  Boven  and  Gilovich 
2003) and can be traced back to Hume (1975/1737, 283) who extols experiences (e.g., 
theatre) as superior to “the acquisition of worthless toys and gewgaws.” 
What  distinguishes  material  from  experiential  purchases?  Material 
purchases are tangible; they may be taken from place to place, they last beyond a 
couple  of  days,  and  they  take  up  physical  space.  Stereos,  cars,  and  houses  are 
examples of  material  goods.  Experiential  purchases are not tangible.  Rather,  the 
purchase  entitles  the  consumer  to  an  event  that  is  finite  in  time.  Movies, 
amusement parks, and restaurant dinners are examples of experiential purchases. 
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The material/experiential distinction is a continuum. For some purchases, for some 
consumers,  locating  particular  purchases  on  the  continuum  may  be  difficult. 
However, the findings of Van Boven and Gilovich (2003) and the intuitions of many 
others (e.g., Easterlin 1995; Pine and Gilmore 1999; Scitovsky 1976) suggest that 
this distinction exists, and that consumers can easily discriminate between the two 
types of purchases. Future research will likely uncover additional subtleties relevant 
to  these  two  categories  of  purchases  (e.g.,  performance  characteristics,  Deighton 
1992,  vividness,  degree  of  social  interaction,  memory  distortions)  but  for  now  I 
concentrate on this basic distinction and terminology. Doing so allows me to speak to 
the experience recommendation,  and to link my work with previous work in the 
area. 
HAPPINESS, CONSUMPTION, AND THE HEDONIC TREADMILL
In addition to  documenting and testing the experience recommendation,  I 
propose an underlying mechanism for  my findings.  I  suspect  that  purchase type 
affects the “hedonic treadmill”  (Brickman and Campbell  1971;  Raghunathan and 
Irwin 2001), the adaptation mechanism that integrates positive purchases into the 
decision makers’ reference point, shifting the purchase into the status quo instead of 
a gain (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). 
Experiences might be less susceptible to this treadmill; people continue to enjoy past 
pleasant experiences via memories (Frederick and Loewenstein 1999;  Van Boven 
and Gilovich 2003) and experiences may have more of a lasting impact on one’s life 
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(Frank 2004; Scitovsky 1976). I explore this possibility in depth in my second essay.
I  respectfully  suggest  that  the  experience  recommendation  may  be 
premature, or at least too broad in scope. Although I agree that positive experiential 
purchases may lead to more lasting happiness than positive material purchases, I 
suspect that the benefit experiences enjoy over material possessions is isolated to 
positive  purchase  outcomes.  The  hedonic  treadmill  can  work  in  reverse  as  well, 
leading to more positive adaptation for negative material purchases and less positive 
adaptation  for  negative  experiential  purchases.  In  other  words,  for  negative 
outcomes,  I suspect that consumers’  experiences will  lead to less happiness than 
their material purchases. Just as positive experiences remain with consumers, in 
memory  and  in  lasting  impressions  on  their  lives,  unfortunately,  negative 
experiences remain with the consumer as well. As Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) 
imply in their review of adaptation levels for different events, adaptation to negative 
events  (such  as  the  death  of  a  loved  one)  may  require  concrete  evidence  of  the 
negative outcome and the resulting emotional acknowledgement of it (as they say, 
“taking a hit”). This concrete evidence is more relevant to material possessions than 
to experiences; it may be easier to move beyond negative material goods than it is to 
move beyond negative experiences. 
As a thought exercise, imagine taking a vacation that turned out badly.  Now 
remember an unfortunate material purchase at the same cost level (say, a piece of 
furniture). For many of us, the vacation may linger in memory at least as negatively 
as the piece of  furniture.  The particular relationship between purchase type and 
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happiness  will  depend  on  a  number  of  factors,  including  the  personality  of  the 
consumer. Thus, I propose that the effect of purchase type (experience vs. material) 
and  outcome valence  (positive  vs.  negative)  on  happiness  depends  on  individual 
characteristics of the consumer such as materialism.
In  this  essay  I  experimentally  address  two  basic  components  of  the 
experience recommendation: (1) whether and when it is appropriate, and (2) whether 
the appropriateness of  the recommendation depends on consumer  characteristics 
such as materialism. I present these results not as the last word on this issue but as 
a launching point for future research streams on the topic. 
In my first two experiments, I find that the advantage of experiences over 
material  purchases holds only for positive purchases;  if  the purchase outcome is 
negative,  I  find  that  this  relationship  significantly  changes,  and  experiential 
purchases have no advantage over material purchases on retrospective happiness. 
Averaged over good and bad experiences, I find no main effect of material versus 
experiential  purchases  on  reported  happiness.  My third  and  fourth  experiments 
explore  whether  this  interaction  depends  on  individual  difference  measures  and 
whether my effects hold when I allow consumers to freely recall negative versus 
positive purchases (without being primed for a purchase type).
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Chapter 1.3: Experiment One
In experiment one I tested whether material and experiential purchases are 
differentially affected by a purchase’s outcome valence. I asked respondents to recall 
a positive or negative purchase that was either material or experiential in nature. 
After the recall stage, respondents indicated their happiness with the purchase and 
answered control questions.
METHOD
A total of 246 undergraduates participated in the study in exchange for extra 
credit.  I  asked respondents to  recall  a  personal  purchase.  In the 2  X 2 between 
subjects  design,  I  manipulated  purchase  type  (experiential  vs.  material)  and 
outcome valence (negative vs. positive). For the material object purchases, I asked 
respondents to:
Please describe a time when you spent about $50 on an object. You kept the 
object for some time and may even still have it. It was an object you could 
hold in your hand. You bought the object to increase your happiness. 
For the experiential purchases, I asked them to:
Please describe a time when you spent about $50 on an experience. In other 
words you did not end up with anything tangible (anything you could hold in 
your hand) at the end of the experience except for your memories. You bought 
the experience to increase your happiness. 
I adapted these instructions (and my happiness scales) from Van Boven and 
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Gilovich’s  (2003)  instructions,  but  wrote  them  with  more  neutral  diction  to 
accommodate  the  positive  and  negative  conditions.  The  outcome  valence  was 
manipulated in the last sentence of the instructions to be either positive (“And, it 
turned out well and you did enjoy the purchase”) or negative (“Unfortunately, it did 
not turn out well and you did not enjoy the purchase”).
Next, respondents rated their purchase on three seven-point happiness scales 
(α = .95): “When you think about this purchase, how happy does it make you?” (Not 
Happy-Moderately Happy-Very Happy), “How much does this purchase contribute to 
your happiness in life?” (Not at All-Moderately-Very Much), “To what extent do you 
think the money spent on this purchase would have been better spent on something 
else—some other type of purchase that would have made you happier?” (Not at all-
Moderately-Very Much).  In addition,  I  asked respondents how many months ago 
they made the purchase and how much they spent on the purchase. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Overall,  I did not find a reliable relationship between the material versus 
experiential variable and reported happiness with the purchases,  F(1,221) = 2.38, 
NS.  However, as shown in Figure 1.1, the effect of purchase type was moderated by 
the  outcome valence  of  the  purchase,  F(1,221)  =  4.48,  p  <  0.05.  When I  fit  the 
“Happiness  =  Purchase  Type”  model  at  each  level  of  purchase  outcome  valence 
(Irwin and McClelland 2001), I replicated the expected result for positive purchases: 
Experiential  purchases  induced  more  reported  happiness,  M =  5.57,  than  did 
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material purchases, M = 5.00, F(1,221) = 4.24, p < 0.05. If the purchase did not turn 
out positively, however, the effect did not hold. Fitting the model for the negative 
purchases, there was not a significant difference in happiness between experiential, 
M = 2.28, and material purchases,  M = 2.37,  F(1,221) = .40, NS. Even if this null 
effect reflected a power issue, this possibility works against the main effect; if the 
effect was there, it would be in the opposite direction from the effect for positive 
purchases. The important conclusion from these results is that positive outcomes 
result in a different pattern of results than do negative outcomes. Controlling for the 
purchase amount and the time since the purchase did not change the interaction 
results  (F(1,219)  =  3.12  when  controlling  for  amount  and  F(1,220)  =  4.28  when 
controlling for time1), indicating that the results cannot be explained by differences 
in  market  value  of  the  purchase  types,  or  differences  in  recall  of  the  subjective 
happiness afforded by the two types of purchases over time.
The results of my first experiment are aligned with findings from previous 
research (e.g., Van Boven and Gilovich 2003), where positive experiential purchases 
lead to significantly more happiness than positive material purchases. However, this 
effect  does  not  hold  for  material  and  experiential  purchases  that  turned  out 
negatively.  When  the  purchase  had  a  negative  outcome,  the  pattern  changed 
significantly and experiential purchases no longer had an advantage over material 
purchases. 
In this first  experiment,  and throughout much of  these two essays,  I  will 
1 A Sobel (1982) test showed that amount paid and time since purchase did not reliably mediate the 
results, t’s < 1.65, p’s > .10.
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make  the  argument  that  the  experiential/material  purchase  distinction,  albeit 
theoretically limited,  is  representative of  what the previous literature and,  more 
important, consumers call experiences and material goods. In fact, a separate study 
(n = 90) evaluated the three most common answers from each of the four conditions 
in experiment one in terms of how experiential or how material each purchase was. I 
found  that  the  material/experiential  distinction  was  clear  to  respondents,  as 
expected.  Material  purchases  were  rated  2.06  on  average,  and  experiential 
purchases 5.84 (on a 1  – 7 scale,  where 1 = completely material,  4  = both,  7 = 
completely experiential) ,  F(1,87) = 571.25, p < 0.01. The magnitude of this effect 
was high (r-squared = .87).
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Chapter 1.4: Experiment Two
One  possible  explanation  for  experiment  one’s  results  is  that  when  an 
experiential purchase turns out badly, it leaves the individual with nothing but bad 
memories. When a material purchase has a negative outcome, however, it leaves the 
individual with something in her hands that can be later sold, traded, or given away. 
Thus, perhaps the negativity of material purchases is dampened by the possibility of 
monetary or other gain from their disposal.
In order to rule out this possible explanation, I include a special caveat in 
experiment  two  on  the  disposal  of  negative  material  purchases.  Specifically, 
respondents  in  the  negative  material  condition  received  an  additional  piece  of 
information stating that the object could not be sold or given away to somebody else.
METHOD
I asked 273 undergraduates to participate in the study in exchange for extra 
credit. They were asked to recall a personal purchase. In the 2 X 2 between subjects 
design I manipulated purchase type (experiential vs. material) and outcome valence 
(negative vs. positive). Procedure and design were the same as in experiment one 
except the respondents in the negative material condition received extra instructions 
to ensure the purchase had no additional residual value. Specifically, I added “The 
object was defective or unsatisfying in some way, and you could not sell it or give it 
to somebody” at the end of the instructions. 
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Next,  respondents  rated  their  purchase  on  the  same  scales  used  in 
experiment one. I also asked them how many months ago they made the purchase 
and how much they spent on the purchase. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Experiment two replicated the first experiment:  The effect of purchase type 
was moderated by the purchase outcome valence, F(1,242) = 3.85, p = 0.05. By fitting 
the  model  at  each  level  of  purchase  outcome  valence,  I  find  that,  for  positive 
outcomes, experiential purchases induced more reported happiness, M = 5.42, than 
did material purchases, M = 4.92, F(1,242) = 9.06, p  < 0.01. However, this effect did 
not  hold  for  negative  outcomes.  The  difference  between  happiness  induced  by 
negative  experiential  purchases,  M =  2.23,  and  happiness  induced  by  negative 
material purchases, M = 2.20, was not significant, F(1,242) = .03, NS.  Once again, 
controlling for the purchase amount and the time since the purchase did not change 
the interaction results (F(1,239) = 3.49 when controlling for amount and F(1,239) = 
3.85 when controlling for time2). 
These results show that the outcome valence by purchase type interaction 
exists above and beyond any residual value held by the material purchase. Both of 
my  experiments  have  shown  the  same  interaction,  which  presupposes  that  the 
material/experiential distinction is valid.
2  Again, a Sobel (1982) test showed that amount paid and time since purchase did not reliably 
mediate the results, t’s < 1, p > .4
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Chapter 1.5: Experiment Three
Experiments one and two treat my respondents as one group. However, as 
marketers, we must wonder what heterogeneity underlies these general results: are 
there segments of consumers who might glean different amounts of happiness from 
purchase types in my two valence conditions? Materialism seems like an obvious 
candidate for moderating my findings.  
Materialism is attachment to material possessions, including an enmeshed 
relationship between the ownership of objects and one’s sense of self (Richins and 
Dawson 1992, 308). Although researchers have addressed the societal and personal 
impact of materialism (many of them arguing that it has a negative influence, e.g., 
Burroughs  and  Rindfleisch 2002;  Kasser  2002),  for  my purposes  the  measure  of 
materialism  allows  me  to  isolate  consumers  for  whom  material  purchases  are 
especially important versus especially unimportant. I expect consumers not high in 
materialism to  show especially  strong valence  by  purchase  type  interactions.  As 
materialism increases, so does the relative importance of material purchases. With 
that in mind,  for materialistic individuals,  positive (negative) material  purchases 
might  have  an  impact  similar  to  the  one  of  positive  (negative)  experiential 
purchases. Thus, I expect a three-way interaction between materialism, valence, and 
purchase type, such that the valence by purchase type interaction grows stronger as 
materialism decreases.
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METHOD
I  asked  211  undergraduate  students  to  participate  in  this  experiment  in 
exchange  for  extra  credit.  The  procedure  was  similar  to  that  used  in  the  first 
experiment. I asked each respondent to remember a purchase. In the 2 X 2 between 
subjects design I manipulated purchase type (experiential vs. material) and outcome 
valence (positive vs.  negative).  The instructions were the same as those used in 
experiment  one;  however,  instead of  a  $50 purchase,  participants  were  asked to 
recall a $300 purchase. The rationale behind this increase was that more expensive 
purchases would carry greater implications for the individuals’ happiness, and the 
increased  variance  in  the  responses  would  allow  me  to  better  detect  individual 
differences.
Each  respondent  was  assigned  a  computer  station  and  received  initial 
instructions. After they described and elaborated on the purchase, they were asked 
to rate their purchase on the same three scales used in the previous experiments, 
which were transformed on an overall “happiness with the purchase” measure (α = 
0.86).  Students also answered the 9-item version of  “The Material  Values Scale” 
(Richins 2004).  The scale includes statements such as “I admire people who own 
expensive homes, cars, and clothes” and “I like a lot of luxury in my life” and asks 
respondents  to  rate  these  statements  on  a  seven-point  disagree-agree  scale.  I 
combined the ratings into one materialism measure (α = .84).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
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Twenty-one participants failed to follow the instructions, reporting negative 
(positive)  purchases  when  asked  to  recall  positive  (negative)  purchases,  and  I 
dropped  them  from  the  subsequent  analysis.  Confirming  the  results  from  my 
previous experiments, I found a significant interaction between purchase type and 
outcome valence, F(1,185) = 3.85, p = 0.05. Fitting the “Happiness = Purchase Type” 
model showed that experiential purchases induced more happiness, M = 5.75, than 
material ones, M = 5.27, F(1,185) = 5.53, p < 0.05, if they turned out positively. This 
effect did not hold if the purchase turned out negatively, F(1,185) < 1, NS. 
Materialism  significantly  influenced  the  valence  by  purchase  type 
interaction:  There  was  a  materialism  by  valence  by  purchase  type  three-way 
interaction, F(1,181) = 6.06, p < .05.  To interpret the interaction, I fit the valence by 
purchase type effects at two levels of materialism, low (one standard deviation below 
the mean)  and high (one standard deviation above the mean),  using the method 
described in Irwin and McClelland (2001).
I  address  the  consumers  low  on  materialism  first.  These  results  were  a 
particularly strong version of my previous results. Again, there was no overall effect 
of purchase type on happiness for low materialism consumers, F(1,181) < 1, NS, and, 
as figure 1.2 shows, there was a significant two-way interaction,  F(1,181) = 9.81, p 
< .001.  Fitting the model both at low materialism and at each level of valence, I 
found that experiential purchases did lead to more happiness if there was a positive 
outcome,  F(1,181) = 6.81, p < .001, but that material purchases led to marginally 
more happiness if there was a negative outcome, F(1,181) = 3.03, p < .08. In other 
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words,  for low materialism consumers,  switching valence resulted in a switch in 
happiness due to purchase type. 
For  high  materialism  consumers  (figure  1.3),  purchase  type  also  did  not 
influence happiness overall,  F(1,181) < 1,  NS. There was a main effect of outcome 
valence,  F(1,181) = 68.46, p < .001, but no two-way interaction,  F(1,181) < 1,  NS. 
High materialism consumers showed neither a benefit of experiences over material 
purchases (or vice versa) nor the interaction I found in previous studies. Comparing 
the high materialism respondents to the low materialism respondents, it is clear 
why there  is  a  main effect,  but  no  interaction.  For  negative  outcomes,  the  high 
materialism respondents are just  as  unhappy with material  as  with experiential 
purchases (because they have high hopes for material purchases that are dashed). 
For positive outcomes, high materialism consumers do not get the extra “high” from 
positive experiences that other consumers get, because they are just as happy with 
the positive material possessions.
The  results  in  experiment  three  replicate  the  results  from  my  previous 
experiments  on  the  experience  recommendation  and  identify  materialism  as  an 
additional limitation to outcome valence. One possible explanation to such effect is 
that  experiential  purchases are more open to positive reinterpretation.  The next 
experiment further develops this possibility and rules out such an explanation. It 
also  seeks  to  replicate  the  moderator  of  materialism using  a  different  purchase 
elicitation method.
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Chapter 1.6: Experiment Four
In experiment one, I gave participants specific instructions to recall either a 
material or an experiential purchase. This design assumes that both material and 
experiential purchases are equally accessible to memory and that they are equally 
associated with negative and positive outcomes. Experiment four instead measures 
associations between purchase type and outcome valence that  occur naturally in 
consumers’ memories, without any prompting for one kind of purchase or another. I 
asked individuals to freely recall three different purchases and then to rate each one 
on a material–experiential continuum. Thus, this method is more reflective of the 
likely continuous nature of the experiential/material construct.
This  experiment  also  rules  out  the  possibility  that  chronic  happiness 
underlies my results by measuring Satisfaction with Life (Pavot and Diener 1993) 
before the primary task, with a 10-minute filler task in between. These SWL scores 
did not have any main effects or interactions with the happiness measure, and will 
not be discussed further.
METHOD
I  randomly  assigned  198  undergraduate  and  MBA  students  from  The 
University of Texas at Austin to either the positive or negative purchase conditions. 
Participants recalled three purchases that turned out either well (positive condition) 
or poorly (negative condition) and then briefly described the purchases. Afterwards, 
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they were given the same definitions of purchase type used in my first experiment 
and were asked to rate each of these purchases on a seven-point scale, anchored by 
“completely  material”  and  “completely  experiential.”  Following  the  ratings 
questions, participants received the same three happiness questions and the MVS 
(Richins 2004) used in the previous experiment.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
All participants reported three purchases, rated them on the experiential or 
material  purchases  continuum,  and  then  rated  the  purchases  on  the  happiness 
scales.  Thus,  I  employed  a  two-step  hierarchical  analysis.  In  the  first  step,  I 
regressed each of the three happiness scores onto the three purchase classification 
ratings, for each participant. This model provided me with slopes (1 per participant) 
describing the influence of purchase type (material vs. experiential) on individual 
levels  of  happiness  with  the  purchase.  In  the  second  step,  I  regressed  these 
happiness by purchase-type slopes onto the valence of the outcome condition, as well 
as the materialism scale and their interaction. This final model captures the effect of 
materialism, valence, and their interaction, on the relationship between purchase 
type  and  happiness.  In  other  words,  does  the  influence  of  purchase  type  on 
happiness  depend  on  valence?  And  does  this  dependency  differ  by  materialism? 
Figure 1.4 plots these results. The y-axis represents the influence of purchase type 
on happiness,  where the more  positive the number,  the greater  the influence  of 
experiential purchases on happiness. Conversely, the more negative the number on 
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the y-axis, the greater the influence of material purchases on happiness.
Memory for material versus experiential purchases did not differ by valence: 
Respondents did not recall experiences, or material purchases, more in the positive 
versus negative conditions F(1,192) = 1, NS. Replicating the results in my previous 
experiments, the “overall” line shows that the relationship between happiness with 
the purchase and purchase type was significantly predicted by purchase valence, 
F(1,192) = 6.22, p < .05. For positive purchases, happiness was positively related to 
how experiential  the purchase was,  Mslope =  .104,  F(1,192)  = 12.69,  p  < 001.  For 
negative  purchases,  there  was  no  relationship  between  happiness  and  purchase 
type, Mslope = .0001, F(1,192) < 1, NS.
As  in  experiment  three,  there  was  a  marginally  significant  interaction 
between outcome valence and materialism, F(1,192) = 3.57, p = .06. At a low level of 
materialism  (one  standard  deviation  below  the  mean)  experiences  led  to  more 
happiness  than  did  purchases  of  material  possessions,  but  only  if  the  outcome 
turned out positively, F(1,192) = 9.53, p < 0.05. However, for individuals with high 
levels  of  materialism (one standard  deviation above the  mean),  experiential  and 
material purchases did not differentially affect happiness, regardless of the valence 
of the outcome of the purchase, F(1,192) = .18, NS.
Note  that  the  results  from this  experiment  are  especially  conservative:  I 
allowed respondents to freely recall any purchases that came to mind. This design 
allows me to make stronger claims about the experience recommendation, because it 
mimics the consumer’s process when remembering a positive (or negative) purchase, 
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without any constraint as to the type of purchase.
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Chapter 1.7: General Discussion
These  experiments  addressed  the  validity  of  recommending  experiential 
purchases  to  our  consumers  as  a  way  to  increase  happiness.  My  results,  and 
intuition,  affirm  that  experiential  purchases  probably  have  more  variance  than 
material purchases:  when they are good, they are very good; but when they are bad, 
they are awful. A new sofa may be disappointing, but it arguably is nowhere near as 
disappointing as finding oneself on top of a freezing cold mountain overnight on an 
adventure vacation. If the adventure vacation had brought only the sunny days and 
sweeping vistas promised in the travel  brochure,  then the experience could have 
been transcendent,  but  every experience purchase has a potential  downside that 
probably should play a role in consumer decision making. Knowledge of the possible 
negatives of an experiential purchase may lead some consumers to choose the sofa 
over the vacation now and again, and I am not prepared to recommend otherwise, 
especially  for  consumers  who  are  not  materialistic  and  thus  not  horribly 
disappointed when material purchases do not bring the happiness they had hoped 
they would.
My  results  replicate  Van  Boven  and  Gilovich  (2003),  showing  that,  for 
positive purchases, experiences lead to greater happiness than material purchases. 
Also, there is a sense in which my results support the experience recommendation 
because I show that, on average, the most happiness obtained through purchasing is 
likely to be obtained through experiential purchases that turn out well. However, 
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the experience recommendation in its pure form is incomplete. My findings suggest 
that a lifetime of negative experiential purchases might lead to quite an unhappy 
life, and furthermore that negative material purchases may not leave as much of a 
negative mark.
We live in a materialistic society (Kasser 2002), so it is not surprising that 
individuals  often  look  to  material  purchases  to  provide  happiness.  I,  like  many 
researchers  (e.g.,  Easterlin  2003;  Burroughs  and  Rindfleisch  2002;  Frank  1985; 
Scitovsky  1976),  would  not  expect  material  goods  to  lead  to  happiness. 
Nevertheless, my results suggest that material purchases can increase happiness, 
both  for  materialistic  and  nonmaterialistic  consumers.  Perhaps  the  hedonic 
treadmill  (Brickman and Campbell  1971;  Raghunathan and Irwin 2001)  is  a  bit 
more  complicated  than  previous  research  had  supposed.  My  results  affirm  that 
experiences may be less susceptible to adaptation compared to material purchases 
(see Frederick and Loewenstein 1999 for an exploration of adaptation rates across 
purchases), but caution that this adaptation difference applies both to negative and 
to  positive  purchases.  My  second  essay  will  test  such  possible  explanation  by 
investigating whether hedonic adaptation rates vary by purchase type and outcome 
valence.
Future  explorations  could  directly  contrast  the  more  atomic  judgments  of 
purchases (e.g.,  ratings of  effectiveness,  satisfaction with the purchase,  intent  to 
repurchase within the brand, quality) that are common in marketing research with 
the  global  happiness  judgments  I  measure.  One  interesting  component  of  this 
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comparison is the potential inconsistency between what people believe they want 
and what actually makes them happy. As Gilbert writes in his book Stumbling on 
Happiness, humans spend a lot of time trying to behave in ways that will make their 
future selves happy (Gilbert 2006). Why do we guess wrong so often? Applied to the 
marketplace, perhaps initial judgments and affective responses to products are not 
particularly predictive of how these products might contribute to happiness in the 
long  run.  I  also  address  the  issue  of  whether  individuals  are  accurate  when 
predicting hedonic adaptation rates for material and experiential purchases in the 
second essay.
Unlike much of the work on materialism, I did not focus on the main effect of 
materialism  on  happiness.  There  remain  unanswered  questions  about  the 
relationship between materialism and the experience recommendation. For example, 
perhaps  consumption  follows  material/experiential  patterns  as  well,  and  it  is 
possible to consume material goods more or less experientially and vice-versa (Holt 
1995).  In  a  broader  sense,  future  research  might  also  address  the  relationship 
between purchase habits and overall happiness.
Future research might also uncover a finer distinction between material and 
experiential  purchases.  In  this  essay,  I  chose  to  be  able  to  communicate  with 
previous research (Van Boven and Gilovich 2003) and theory (Frank 1999; Scitovsky 
1976) using a definition that is closely related to what consumers consider material 
or experiential purchases.
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SECOND ESSAY – THE ROLE OF HEDONIC ADAPTATION, ITS 
PREDICTION AND ANTECEDENTS ON THE INFLUENCE OF 
TYPE OF PURCHASE ON HAPPINESS.
Chapter 2.1: Introduction
In  my  previous  essay,  I  have  shown  that  the  effect  of  type  of  purchase 
(material vs. experiential) on happiness is moderated by the valence of the purchase 
outcome. For positive purchases, experiential purchases lead to greater happiness. 
However,  for  negative  purchases,  experiences  have  no  advantage  over  material 
purchases.
This interaction is further moderated by an individual's level of materialism. 
Individuals high in materialism do not show any of the previously reported effects, 
aside  from  the  main  effect  of  valence  outcome.  Individuals  low  in  materialism, 
however, exhibit a particularly stronger version of the type of purchase by valence 
outcome interaction.
I have argued that the previously found interaction is likely to be explained 
by a difference in hedonic adaptation rates for material and experiential purchases. 
Briefly, I propose that individuals adapt more slowly to experiential purchases, as 
compared to material purchases. After the same given period of time, individuals 
would  be  happier  with  an  experiential  purchase,  when  compared  to  a  material 
purchase of the same initial happiness level. At the same rate, individuals would be 
more unhappy with a negative experiential purchase over the same period of time, 
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when compared to a material purchase. Figure 2.1 illustrates such scenario. Frank 
(2004) and Van Boven and Gilovich (2003) had already speculated about the possible 
effect  of  hedonic  adaptation  on  the  influence  of  type  of  purchase  on  consumer 
happiness. Frank (2004), for example, argues that experiences might have a longer 
lasting effect on happiness. Van Boven and Gilovich (2003) raised the possibility 
that experiential purchases might be less susceptible to the hedonic treadmill.
In  this  second  essay,  I  present  evidence  supporting  the  hypothesis  that 
individuals adapt more slowly to experiential purchases, than to material purchases. 
I also show that the differential effect of hedonic adaptation on type of purchase is, 
at  least  partially,  driven  by  how  individuals  recall  experiential  and  material 
purchases.  I  argue  that  material  purchases,  due  to  their  tangible  nature,  give 
consumers an accurate representation of what the purchase was. When a consumer 
holds a previously purchased coffee mug, there is little ambiguity about the mug's 
size, color, shape, weight, etc. Experiential purchases, however, reside in memory 
and their  representation is  only as accurate as the consumer's  recollection.  As  I 
argue in more detail later in this essay, the presence of a constant memory cue, in 
form of the object itself, makes the recollection of material purchases more accurate. 
As a consequence. adaptation to material purchases happen faster, when compared 
to experiential purchases.
Finally, I present evidence that individuals are not aware of different hedonic 
adaptation  rates  for  different  purchase  types.  More  specifically,  I  show  that 
individuals predict opposite patterns of hedonic adaptation for positive experiential 
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and material purchases. They predict slower adaptation rates for positive material 
purchases and faster for positive experiential purchases.
This essay's set of results are not only important for the hedonic adaptation 
literature, a field where experimental work is scarce (Frederick and Loewenstein 
1999),  but also for consumer researchers attempting to understand the impact of 
different processes on hedonic adaptation and their ultimate consequences on choice. 
For example, beyond the already introduced effects to be investigated in this essay, 
little  is  known about  the  role  of  memory  on  hedonic  adaptation  (Frederick  and 
Loewenstein  1999).  Does  recall  make  adaptation  faster,  as  we re-experience  the 
same stimulus? Or perhaps  recall  hinders adaptation,  by resetting the reference 
point of the experience (Frederick and Loewenstein 1999).
Knowing  whether  individuals  are  accurate  when  predicting  hedonic 
adaptation rates also has important theoretical and practical implications. We make 
choices taking into consideration how happy our future selves will be (Gilbert 2006). 
Following  this  rationale,  it  makes  sense  that,  given  the  opportunity  to  choose 
between equally attractive purchases,  consumers will  choose the one with slower 
adaptation rates, or in other words, the purchase that will make them happier the 
longest. Normatively, the option with the slower adaptation rate (assuming equal 
levels of initial happiness) is the option that maximizes utility (i.e., happiness) for 
the consumer.
This essay is organized as follows. I will first review the literature on hedonic 
adaptation, its origins and moderators, especially the possible effects of memory on 
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hedonic adaptation. I then proceed with a brief review on anticipation to hedonic 
adaptation  and  then  proceed  with  four  experiments.  Experiment  one  will  test 
hedonic adaptation for different purchase types and will show that individuals adapt 
more slowly to experiential purchases, than to material purchases. Experiments two 
and  three  will  investigate  the  hypothesis  that  a  difference  in  how  individuals 
remember  material  and  experiential  purchases  is  driving  the  results  found  in 
experiment one. Finally, experiment four will show that individuals are inaccurate 
when  it  comes  to  predicting  hedonic  adaptation  rates  for  both  material  and 
experiential  purchases.  This  essay  closes  with  implications  for  theory  and 
suggestions for future studies.
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Chapter 2.2: Theoretical Background
Hedonic adaptation (Frederick and Loewenstein 1999) refers to the lessening 
of a hedonic response over time. Better things become less good over time, and worse 
things  become  better.  Hedonic  adaptation  follows  phenomena  described  by  the 
adaptation-level theory (Helson, 1964). Adaptation, in its most comprehensive sense, 
first came into psychology from biology, where it refers to a sense of “adjustment to 
the conditions under which species must live in order to survive, and from sensory 
physiology,  where  it  is  used in  the  much more  restricted sense  of  decrement  in 
intensity of sensation...” (Helson, 1964, 37) Adaptation explains, for example, why 
although blinded by the bright daylight after leaving a building we slowly get used 
to the new level of brightness and are eventually able to see normally.
 Hedonic adaptation takes two related forms, one has been used to refer to 
the  reduction  of  the  effect  of  a  constant  repeated  stimulus  (e.g.,  traffic  noise; 
Weinstein 1982 or incarceration; Wormith 1984), the other refers to the reduction in 
hedonic response to a stimulus that occurs once (e.g., buying a luxury good; Frank 
1999). 
Although at this juncture there is not much empirical evidence on the issue, 
there has been some suggestion in previous literature that  hedonic adaptation rates 
may vary by type of stimuli. For instance, Van Boven (2005) surmises that people 
may  tend  to  adapt  faster  to  material  purchases  because  (positive)  experiential 
purchases  remain  open  to  positive  reinterpretation  (Mitchell  et  al.  1997).  As  a 
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consequence, memory keeps the experiences from declining in happiness over time. 
Likewise, in their review of adaptation rates, Fredrick and Loewenstein (1999) find 
that people show very little adaptation both to certain positive experiences such as 
plastic surgery and certain negative experiences such as loss of a loved one, whereas 
adaptation to material gains such as a particular increase in income is quite rapid.
In a chapter of his book  Luxury Fever entitled “Gains that Endure,” Frank 
(1999,  88)  suggests  that  luxury  goods  leave  consumers  dissatisfied  because 
consumers  adapt  to  luxury  goods  especially  quickly.  He considers  whether  some 
purchase types might provide slower adaptation than luxury goods, and suggests 
experiential  purchases,  such  as  vacations,  saying  that,  “Provided  they  are  of 
sufficient  duration,  vacations  have  been  shown  to  have  restorative  effects  that 
persist long after people return to work.” The one time purchase of a vacation may 
lead to  slower adaptation over  time,  and thus  more happiness,  than spending a 
similar amount on a luxury object.
I agree with this supposition, and expand it to suggest that in general people 
adapt to experiences, on average, more slowly than to material purchases. Note that 
I apply this proposition both to negative and positive purchases: hedonic adaptation 
would result not only in a positive experience inducing more happiness, but also in a 
negative experience inducing less happiness than the comparable material purchase 
with the same initial happiness level. In my first experiment in this essay, I directly 
test hedonic adaptation rates over time, varying by purchase type and valence, and 
show hedonic adaptation underlies my primary finding in this essay. In other words, 
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I propose (and show) that hedonic adaptation, by reducing the unhappiness with 
negative purchases as well  as the happiness with positive purchases at different 
rates  across  purchase  types,  results  in  concomitant  differences  in  retrospective 
happiness. Furthermore, I show that this adaptation happens quite quickly, often in 
a matter of minutes.
One of the reasons individuals might adapt more slowly to experiences is that 
adaptation to experiential purchases often occurs solely in an individual's memory. 
For  example,  buying  a  t-shirt  leaves  us  with  the  t-shirt  in  our  possession,  and 
subsequent judgments of  the purchase do not have to  rely on memory,  once the 
object is still physically accessible. As soon as an experience, such as a dinner or 
movie is  consumed,  is  gone,  residing only in our memories.  As a consequence,  I 
wonder  whether  recall,  namely  the  presence  or  absence  of  a  memory  cue,  will 
accelerate or hinder the hedonic adaptation process.
MEMORY AND HEDONIC ADAPTATION
Frederick and Loewenstein (1999), in a discussion of potential moderators of 
hedonic adaptation, present mixed evidence for the role of memory on the adaptation 
process. On the one hand, in their discussion of the role of uncertainty on hedonic 
adaptation,  they suggest  that  being unsure  of  the  outcome of  an event  impedes 
adaptation to that event. Explicitly, they point out that for events with a potentially 
negative outcome “successful hedonic adaptation may require a person to 'take a hit' 
–  to  recognize,  admit,  and  confront  some  loss”  instead  of  remaining  uncertain 
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(Frederick  and  Loewenstein  1999,  317)  Applied  to  my  context,  this  statement 
implies  that  memory cues  should influence  adaptation:  Given that  memory cues 
render an event more certain, memory cues should speed adaptation.
Results from Mitchell et al. (1997) point to the same rationale. The authors 
have found that, when recalling positive experiences, individuals tend to forget little 
misfortunes that accompanied that experience, focusing only on its positive aspects. 
As a consequence, memories for positive experiences tend to be more positive than 
the actual experience. Memory cues would remind individuals of both positive and 
negative aspects of their experiences and, hence, provide a more accurate (i.e. less 
uncertain)  picture.  In  the  absence  of  memory  cues,  however,  experiences  are 
construed based solely on its positive (or negative) central aspects. This distinction 
maps onto my main proposition. When exposed to memory cues, individuals have the 
opportunity to contemplate both negative and positive aspects of their experiences, 
incorporating negative  elements  to  positive  experiences  and positive  elements  to 
negative experiences. This, in turn, will make adaptation to positive and negative 
experiences faster.
Finally, memory cues can encourage habituation by acting as repetition of an 
experience. Sequential exposure to a stimulus can help individuals to adapt to it 
faster. This process is based on habituation. Habituation happens at a very basic 
level,  and  refers  to  decrease  in  the  response  to  repetitive  stimuli  (Kandel  and 
Schwartz 1982). Along those lines, providing memory cues for their experiences give 
individuals another opportunity to re-visit that experience, increasing repetition and 
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the subsequence chance of habituation.
On the other hand,  Frederick and Loewenstein (1999)  suggest  that  event 
reminders might slow hedonic adaptation. For individuals who suffer from the loss 
of a dear family member, for example, the environment is often full of triggers that 
cue thoughts and memories of their loved one (Shuchter and Zisook 1993). It may 
feel as if every memory cue sends the individual's hedonic response back to the level 
where it was when the loss occurred.
Consonant with this view, Hsee and Tsai (2008) consider hedonic adaptation 
to  be  a  psychophysical  process  that  happens  through  dilution  of  attention.  As 
attention is diverted from the stimulus, the stimulus invokes weaker and weaker 
responses. In my context, this theory supports the notion that, being reminded of 
either a positive or negative experience would impair hedonic adaptation, because 
the reminder would bring attentional focus back to the original stimulus.
Thus,  there  are  two  equally  compelling  possibilities  for  the  influence  of 
memory on hedonic adaptation. Both have implications for my previous findings on 
happiness with experiential versus material purchases, because material purchases 
naturally involve more possibilities for memory cues than do experiential purchases. 
Previous research does not  conclusively  establish the role  of  memory in hedonic 
adaptation.  I will  take the position that  memory cues  speed adaptation,  for  two 
reasons. First, my first experiment will show that consumers adapt more quickly to 
material purchases than to experiential purchases, and memory cues are an obvious 
difference between these two types of purchases. Second, although the arguments for 
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the  moderation  of  adaptation  due  to  memory  cues  are  suggestive,  I am  more 
convinced by the argument that memory cues will speed the adaptation process, for 
the simple reason that memory cues give individuals an opportunity to re-experience 
their choice, increasing habituation, at the same time as they reduce uncertainty 
about their choice.
In my second and third experiments, I investigate the effects of memory cues 
on the process of hedonic adaptation to experiential purchases. I hypothesize that 
memory cues will make experiential purchases closer to material purchases when it 
comes  to  adaptation rates.  In  other words,  I  expect  adaptation to  happen faster 
when  individuals  are  presented  with  memory  cues,  mapping  onto  one  possible 
reason  why  individuals  adapt  faster  to  material  purchases,  when  compared  to 
experiential purchases.
PREDICTIONS OF HEDONIC ADAPTATION
Just as important as understanding how individuals adapt to material and 
experiential  purchases, and the role memory plays in driving such differences in 
hedonic  adaptation  rates,  is  to  understand  whether  individuals  expect  different 
hedonic  adaptation  rates  for  experiential  and  material  purchases,  if  at  all. 
Predictions of hedonic adaptation rates are likely to inform future choices. Given the 
choice between two different purchases with equal predicted utility, consumers will 
chose the one that holds its value the longest. In other words, consumers will likely 
choose the option with the slower adaptation rates.
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The now rich literature on affective forecasting shows repeatedly that people 
are poor predictors of  how their future affective experiences will  make them feel 
(e.g.,  Gilbert 2006, Kahneman and Snell 1992, Mitchell et al. 1997, Wilson et al. 
2000). Individuals mispredict the intensity of their feelings (Mitchell et al. 1997), 
how long it will take to get over those feelings (Gilbert 2006, Kahneman and Snell 
1992)  and  how  environmental  factors  will  act  to  mitigate  their  affective  states 
(Wilson et al. 2000).
However, little is known about how individuals predict hedonic adaptation to 
their affective experiences. In one of the few empirical accounts of such predictions, 
Kahneman and Snell (1992) showed that individuals expected successive tastings of 
plain  yogurt  to  become  increasingly  unpleasant.  In  fact,  after  successive  trials, 
individuals in their sample rated the yogurt as less unpleasant over time. In this 
essay's terms, individuals in Kahneman and Snell's (1992) studies failed to account 
for hedonic adaptation to the taste of plain yogurt.
More recent studies have also shown that individuals are inaccurate when 
predicting  adaptation  to  pleasurable  and  aversive  stimuli.  Nelson  and  Meyvis 
(2008), for example, found that people expect aversive experiences to become more 
bearable  as  they  are  broken  up.  However,  the  authors  found  that  adding 
interruptions  to  aversive  experiences  makes  the  overall  experience  even  more 
negative.  The same pattern is found for positive experiences.  Nelson and Meyvis 
(2008) found that individuals prefer positive experiences to be undisturbed when, in 
fact, breaking up positive experiences increase their overall enjoyment.
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Similarly,  Riis  et  al.  (2005)  brought  evidence  that  healthy  people 
underestimate the self-reported well-being of individuals with serious illness. One of 
the reasons why healthy people show such inaccuracy is because they fail to account 
for hedonic adaptation. They fail to take into consideration the fact that unhealthy 
individuals  adapt  to  their  condition  and  are  able  to  lead  a  happy  life.  Calling 
attention to the hedonic adaptation process makes for more accurate predictions of 
the quality of life (i.e., well-being) of others (Ubel, Loewenstein and Jepson 2005).
Finally,  Wang,  Novemsky and Dhar (forthcoming) showed that consumers 
fail  to predict hedonic adaptation to products (material purchases).  Interestingly, 
although consumers hold correct beliefs about hedonic adaptation, i.e. they expect 
enjoyment with products to fade away over time, they fail to incorporate this belief 
in the prediction of hedonic adaptation for a specific product. Wang, Novemsky and 
Dhar (forthcoming) have show that, only when attention is drawn to the time period 
over which a product is consumed, hedonic adaptation is considered and, therefore, 
influence choice. These results are consistent with the “focusing illusion,” (Schkade 
and Kahneman 1998) where individuals mispredict adaptation to negative events by 
failing to consider peripheral aspects of their life (e.g., inaccurately assuming that 
moving  from  cold  Michigan  to  sunny  California  will  drastically  increase  their 
happiness in life by ignoring that other factors, besides weather, also account for 
their overall happiness).
My essay extends this framework to different types of purchase. Not only I 
will  focus  on  whether  individuals  predict  hedonic  adaptation  rates,  but  also  on 
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whether predicted adaptation rates are different from experienced adaptation for 
experiential and material purchases. Following Dolan and White's (2006) dynamic 
well-being  framework,  individuals  anticipate  and  plan  behaviors  that  will  be 
conducive to their overall happiness. Accordingly, they choose options that will lead 
to  greater  happiness.  Given  that  individuals  are  aware  of  adaptation  (Wang, 
Novemsky  and  Dhar  forthcoming),  it  is  only  natural  to  assume individuals  will 
choose the longer-lasting,  happiness maximizing option.  Knowing whether people 
are  accurate  when  estimating  hedonic  adaptation  rates  for  different  types  of 
purchases can help illuminate their choice process.
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Chapter 2.3: Experiment 1
My previous essay has showed that the effect of purchase type on happiness 
depends on the outcome valence. However, I have not directly tested my proposed 
mechanism for this effect. Previously, I suggested that adaptation differences drive 
this interaction. People adapt more slowly to experiences than to material purchases 
and, as a consequence, happiness is mitigated less over time for experiences than for 
material purchases. In this first experiment, participants were given the chance to 
choose an actual product (material purchase) or experience (experiential purchase). I 
then  measured  their  happiness  with  the  purchase,  using  the  same  happiness 
measures that have been used throughout my studies.  I  collected the ratings (1) 
immediately following consumption of the chosen option, (2) seven minutes later, (3) 
one day later, (4) one week later, and (5) two weeks later. 
METHOD
Three hundred thirty five students from The University of Texas at Austin 
participated  in  this  experiment  in  exchange  for  extra-credit  in  an  introductory 
marketing course. Each participant was assigned (without their knowledge) to either 
a “material purchase” or an “experiential purchase” condition. In the experiential 
condition,  the  participants  were  told  that  they  could  use  three  “lab  dollars”  to 
purchase one experience from a set of three possible options (a video clip, a song, or a 
video game) to consume (i.e., watch the video, listen to the song, or play the video-
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game) in the lab session. The three items presented to the respondents were chosen 
randomly from a pool of seven possible experiences (two video clips, two songs, and 
three video-games, and were each priced at $3). After the choice task, participants 
watched the video, listened to the song, or played the video-game in the experiential 
purchase condition. Once the experience was over, participants answered the same 
3-item happiness scale used in my previous studies. Then, participants took a 7-
minute  break.  More  specifically,  the  experimenter  made  the  following 
announcement, “We are going to have a 7-minute break in this session. During this 
break, you can do anything you want. The lab door will remain open, so you can 
come and go at your will.” This break provided me with the first adaptation period.
After the 7-minute break, participants answered the same set of dependent 
measures  used  in  the  first  part  of  the  study  (before  the  break).  They  saw  the 
following instructions 
We are going to ask you some final questions about your choice of a [their 
choice].  We  know  we  asked  these  questions  earlier.  However,  we  are 
interested in your answers to them now (your answers may be different or 
they may be the same).
They  were  then  debriefed  with  instructions  to  answer  the  follow-up 
questionnaires. The follow-up questionnaires were collected through the internet one 
day, one week, and two weeks after the in-lab experimental session. Each follow-up 
questionnaire consisted of a brief introduction reminding my participants of the in-
lab  study,  without  any  reference  to  the  options  from  which  they  had  chosen. 
Following this introduction, participants responded, via e-mail, with (1) a very brief 
description of what they had chosen (to check that they remembered what they had 
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chosen,  which all  of them did) and (2) their answer to the same happiness scale 
question used in my lab sessions.
Individuals  in  the  material  purchase  condition  went  through  the  same 
procedure  used  in  the  experiential  purchase  condition  except  that  they  chose  to 
“purchase” one item from a group of three products (instead of three experiences), 
randomly sampled from a set  of  seven options  (a set  of  pencils,  a  can holder,  a 
keychain, a ruler, a deck of cards, a screwdriver, a small picture frame). The items 
all had retail prices close to $3.00 (the amount the participants were “charged” in lab 
dollars for the purchase.)  After the choice,  participants in the material  purchase 
condition received their product and were told they could take this product home 
with them.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
I  had  100% response  rates  for  dependent  measures  collected immediately 
after choice and 7 minutes after choice (i.e., the adaptation rates collected in lab). 
Response rates were 83.3% for dependent measures collected the day after, 69.8% for 
the week after, and 61.1% for two weeks after choice. A hazard regression indicated 
that response rates were not  influenced by my between-subject  type of  purchase 
manipulation  (χ2(1)  =  0.79,  NS).  In  other  words,  purchase  type  did  not  affect 
response rates.  In addition,  there was variance in the choice of  experiences and 
material  goods;  the choice probabilities for the seven experiences were .26,  .22,  .
19, .13, .11, .09 and .05, and for the seven material goods were .30, .21, .20, .14, .
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08, .07 and .03. 
As in my previous studies, these data had two between subjects variables: 
purchase  type  (which  was  manipulated),  and  purchase  valence  (which  was 
measured).  In  addition,  I  had  a  within-subject  longitudinal  variable,  time  since 
purchase.  Consistent  with  many (if  not  most)  longitudinal  data  of  psychological 
responses (e.g., Drew and Abbott 2006), my data followed a power law function:
y = axk (1)
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 depict happiness scores for material (2.2) and experiential 
(2.3) purchases over time (in minutes) by the initial happiness scores (which I term 
the “setpoints”). The setpoints are the continuous measure of the purchase valence 
(positive to negative). As the figures show, I obtained a classic power function shape, 
with  most  of  the  change  happening  in  the  first  time  periods.  The  average  AIC 
(Akaike  Information  Criterion,  for  which  lower  values  indicate  better  model  fit) 
across setpoint was -21.08 for the power law model, -14.29 for a quadratic model, 
and -11.08 for a linear model.
The proper analysis for the data is a hierarchical mixed-design model that 
first captures the longitudinal effects and then tests for differences in these effects 
by the between subjects variables.  The first step captured the power-function by 
using the  standard  log(y)-log(x)  model  (the  power  function  becomes  linear  when 
transformed in this way). Thus, for my model I regressed log-transformed happiness 
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scores onto the log-transformed time since choice. Time since choice was measured 
in minutes (one minute, seven, 1440 (one day), 10080 (one week), and 20160 (two 
weeks) minutes after the choice.)
This  step  calculates  a  slope  for  each  respondent  reflecting  the  effect  of 
elapsed time on happiness with the  choice (note that  the slope from this  model 
corresponds to the exponent in the power function).
log(happiness) = β0 + β1i x log( time) + error (2)
The resulting individual slopes were then regressed onto type of  purchase 
(experiential vs. material purchases), each individual’s set point, and the interaction 
between both variables:
β1i = β0 + βa x type of purchase + βb x setpoint + βc x type of purchase x setpoint + error (3)
Thus, in this model I test for different adaptation rates for experiential and material 
purchases, as well as my purchase type by valence interaction. 
This regression confirmed that the relationship between time since choice 
and happiness (β1i) is moderated by type of purchase and initial happiness with the 
choice, F(1,245) = 14.50, p < .001. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 help explicate this interaction 
(using the methods described in Irwin and McClelland 2001). Figure 2.4 plots (log) 
happiness scores for choices made in the material purchase condition by (log) time 
since consumption. Each line corresponds to a model fit at different setpoints (1, 2, 6, 
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and 7, where 1 is the lowest happiness score and 7 the highest). Figure 2.5 presents 
the analogous data for experiential purchases.
As  the  figures  show,  the  slopes  are  steeper  in  the  material  than  in  the 
experience conditions,  F(1,245)  = 4.83,  p < .05,  showing that  material  purchases 
indeed show faster adaptation than experiential purchases. In fact, in this data I do 
not see much adaptation at all for particularly negative purchases. As Frederick and 
Loewenstein  (1999)  explain,  some  situations  do  not  induce  adaptation,  and 
sometimes they induce sensitization (increased sensitivity over time). Perhaps some 
negative experiences are of this nature, although of course I hesitate to make too 
much  of  this  possible  sensitization  apart  from  noting  that  it  is  evocative  (and 
consistent with my expectation of lack of adaptation to experiences).
To  underscore  the  effect  these  adaptation differences  have on subsequent 
happiness,  I  tested the effects of  purchase type and setpoint (i.e.,  valence of  the 
outcome; in other words the interaction originally described in my previous studies) 
across the different points in time. When the model is fit (Irwin and McClelland 
2001)  at  time  two  (seven  minutes  after  the  choice),  there  is  not  an  interaction 
between type of purchase and valence of the outcome, F(1,245) < 1, NS. However, as 
time passes, this interaction appears, F(1,245) = 8.14, F(1,245) = 9.58, and F(1,245) 
= 9.96 (all p < .05), for measures taken one day, one week, and two weeks after the 
lab session,  respectively.  This  set  of  results  not  only  replicates  my retrospective 
happiness  findings  from previous  studies,  but  also  supports  my contention  that 
hedonic adaptation is driving the effects.
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Note  that  the  stimuli  in  this  study  were  nested  under  the  material  and 
experiential categories. There are pros and cons to nested designs in this context. 
Although participants chose from among a wide variety of potential purchases and 
no particular purchase dominated choice within the two purchase types, as in all 
nested  designs  the  material/experiential  classification  is  confounded  with  the 
particular choices within the two categories. The benefit of a nested design, which 
probably explains its popularity in marketing research, is that the items naturally 
embody  the  categories  (i.e.,  games  actually  are  experiences;  rulers  actually  are 
material goods.)
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Chapter 2.4: Experiment 2
The previous experiment has shown that individuals adapt more slowly to 
experiential  purchases when compared to material  purchases.  I previously raised 
the possibility that this difference in hedonic adaptation rates is due to the presence 
of a physical representation of the purchase in the material purchase condition and 
hypothesized that giving individuals memory cues for experiential purchases would 
make  them  adapt  faster  to  those  purchases,  when  compared  to  experiential 
purchases where memory cues are absent.
In  this  experiment,  my participants  are  given a  choice  of  an experiential 
purchase  and  they  consume  this  experience  in  the  lab.  Much  like  in  the  first 
experiment, my participants answer to a happiness scale one minute, seven minutes, 
a day, a week, and two weeks after the consumption of the experience. However, 
they are assigned to either a condition with or without memory cues before each 
measure of happiness. 
METHOD
Three hundred and sixteen students from The University of Texas at Austin 
participated  in  this  experiment  in  exchange  for  extra-credit  in  an  introductory 
marketing  course.  The  procedure  for  this  experiment  followed  that  of  the  first 
experiment.  However,  participants  were  exposed  only  to  experiential  purchases. 
Each participant was assigned (without their knowledge) to either a “no memory 
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cue” (control) or a “memory cue” condition. In the no memory cue (control) condition, 
participants  followed  the  exact  same  procedure  employed  in  the  experiential 
purchase  condition  of  experiment  one.  They  chose  one  experience  out  of  three 
possible options (a video clip, a song, or a video game) to consume (i.e., watch the 
video, listen to the song, or play the video-game) in the lab session. The three items 
presented  to  the  respondents  were  chosen  randomly  from a  pool  of  six  possible 
experiences (two video clips, two songs, and two video-games) and were each priced 
at $3 (three “lab-dollars.”)  After the choice task,  participants watched the video, 
listened to the song, or played the video-game in the experiential purchase condition. 
Once the experience was over,  participants answered the same 3-item happiness 
scale used in my previous studies. Then, participants took a 7-minute break after 
which, they answered the same set of dependent measures used in the first part of 
the study (before the break). They were then debriefed with instructions to answer 
the follow-up questionnaires. The follow-up questionnaires were collected through 
the internet one day, one week, and two weeks after the in-lab experimental session. 
The follow-up questionnaires for the no memory cue (control) condition contained the 
same set of dependent measures collected this far and were the same as those used 
in the experiential purchase condition of experiment one.
Individuals in the memory cue condition followed the exact same procedure 
as those in the no memory cue condition, with one difference. After the first exposure 
to their choice and first measure of happiness, every subsequent happiness measure 
(seven minutes, one day, one week and two weeks after the choice) was preceded by 
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a 35-second sample of their previous choice. This sample was the first 35 seconds of 
the original experience. For example, individuals who chose the “Friends” video-clip, 
saw a 35-second clip of  the same video before each of  the follow-up measures of 
happiness.
STIMULI
This experiment employed two different sets of stimuli, set A and set B. Set 
A, is the exact same set of experiences used in experiment one. Set B consists of 
alternative  versions  of  the  same  videos,  songs  and  video-games,  with  purposely 
lower quality, to increase variance in my happiness measures and to overcome one 
possible limitation from experiment one.
In my first  experiment,  the  mean happiness  with  experiential  purchases, 
measured right after choice, was 4.71, with standard-deviation of 1.16 and values 
ranging from 1.67 to 7 (happiness was a composite measure of three items, ranging 
from  1  –  7,  where  4  is  a  neutral  point).  Although  my  previous  models  were 
significant at different setpoints, I wanted to consider a set of stimuli that is more 
representative of the full range of possible happiness outcomes. In fact, in this new 
experiment, the new set of stimuli (set B) present lower initial happiness scores (Mset  
B = 4.12, SDset B = 1.61 vs. Mset A = 4.62, SDset A = 1.08, F(1,314) = 10.64, p < .01.) and 
encompass the full range (1 – 7) of values used in the happiness scale. The  stimuli 
set (A and B) variable did not interact with any of my variables of interest (F(1,253) 
= 0.31, NS for the interaction with memory, F(1,253) = 0.24, NS, for the interaction 
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with setpoint and  F(1,253) = 0.62, NS for the three-way interaction with memory 
and setpoint) and, hence, I will use both sets indistinctly.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Participation rates were 100% for the in-lab portion of the study (right after 
choice and 7 minutes after choice), and decreased to 89.5% a day after, 86.7% a week 
after and to 81.9% two weeks after choice. As with my previous studies, the three 
items of the happiness scale were averaged into a unique happiness measure (α = .
84)
The data was analyzed using the same two-step procedure employed in the 
first experiment. In the first step, described previously by equation 2, I regressed the 
log-transformed  happiness  scores  onto  log-transformed  time  (in  minutes  since 
choice). The second step regressed the resulting slopes of the first step onto setpoint 
(the initial measure of happiness) and my memory manipulation (memory cue vs. 
control) and the interaction between the two terms. Equation 4 below describes this 
second step of the model.
β1i = β0 + βa x memory + βb x setpoint + βc x memory x setpoint + error (4)
This model shows a significant two-way interaction between setpoint (a proxy 
variable for the valence of the participant's experience) and memory (memory cue vs. 
control) (F(1,2573) = 3.99, p < .05). This interaction is significant for the first three 
3 17 observations were considered outliers following the studentized residuals criterion (Cohen et al. 
2003) and were eliminated from this analysis
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data collection times (right after choice, seven minutes after choice and a day after 
choice). If taken into consideration the first four and five data collection periods, the 
interaction ceases to be significant (F(1,260) = 2.85, p = .09 and F(1,262) = 0.43, NS, 
respectively).
Much like figures 2.4 and 2.5, figures 2.6 and 2.7 depict the effects of memory 
and setpoint on the influence of time on happiness with the experience for the first 
three periods of time (right after the choice, seven minutes after the choice and a day 
after  the  choice)  for  individuals  in  the  control  and  memory  cues  conditions, 
respectively. For clarity purposes, the model was fitted (Irwin and McClelland 2001) 
only at setpoints 1 (negative stimuli) and 7 (positive stimuli). Steeper lines mean 
faster hedonic adaptation.  As predicted,  individuals in the memory cue condition 
adapt faster than those in the control condition, especially when the model is fitted 
at setpoint 1 (negative purchases) (F(1,257) = 7.58, p < .01). When the model is fitted 
at  setpoint  7  (positive  purchases),  the  slopes  in  the  memory  condition  are  not 
different than the slopes in the control condition (F(1,257) = 0.52, NS). Interestingly, 
figures 2.6 and 2.7 seem to follow the same pattern of results found in experiment 
one (figures 2.4 and 2.5).
This  second  experiment  brought  evidence  that  the  difference  in  hedonic 
adaptation rates for material and experiential purchases found in experiment one 
can be, at least partially, explained by differences in the way individuals recall the 
stimuli.  Material  purchases  are  promptly  available  and,  as  such,  accurate 
representations of the benefits they provide. Experiential purchases, on the other 
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hand,  live  in  our  memories  and  are,  consequently,  prone  to  be  inaccurately 
represented.  When given a memory cue for  their experiences,  and hence a more 
accurate  representation  of  them,  individuals  adapt  faster  to  experiences,  when 
compared to experiences where memory cues are absent.
This experiment was the first effort to describe the role of memory in the 
process  of  hedonic  adaptation  with  different  purchase  types.  As  such,  it  has 
limitations. The targeted two-way interaction (memory by setpoint) holds significant 
for the first three periods of data collection (right after choice, seven minutes and a 
day after choice) and ceases to be significant afterwards. There is not enough data to 
explain why this model is not significant for the last two periods of data collection. 
One possible account relies on the fact that, like in experiment one, the data follow a 
power-law function (see figures 2.2 and 2.3) and, as such, much of the adaptation 
happens in the first three periods. Another speculative explanation relies on possible 
effects  of  the  memory  cue  manipulation  beyond  the  three  initial  periods.  It  is 
possible that, for the last two periods of data collection (one and two weeks after the 
lab session), the memory cue becomes less of a cue and more of a “new experience” of 
the individual's choice.
Another limitation resides in the fact that individuals in the memory cue 
condition  saw  (or  listen  to,  or  played)  a  35-second  snippet  of  their  experience, 
whereas individuals in the control condition did not have wait for 35 seconds to start 
answering the follow-up questions.  This  difference (a 35-second wait)  could be a 
potential  confound and partially account  for  some of  the effects.  The next  study 
(experiment 3) will try to overcome this limitation.
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Chapter 2.5: Experiment 3
This  experiment  follows  a  similar  procedure  to  the  one  employed  in 
experiment 2. Participants are assigned to one of three between-subjects conditions 
(no  memory cue,  memory  cue  and  elaboration  condition).  This  design  overcomes 
limitations of experiment 2 by (1) controlling for the amount of time each participant 
had to wait before she saw the dependent variables (happiness scale)  and by (2) 
creating  a  condition  where  the  recall  task  did  not  include  a  repetition,  even  if 
partial, of the stimulus experienced in lab. Asking participants to “re-experience” 
their in-lab choice is arguably different than providing them with an opportunity to 
remember their choice. In this study, a different manipulation of recall is introduced 
by  asking  individuals  to  elaborate  about  their  choice  using  three  or  four  short 
sentences.
METHOD
Four  hundred  and  thirty  one  students  from  The  University  of  Texas  at 
Austin  participated  in  this  experiment  in  exchange  for  extra-credit  in  an 
introductory marketing course. The procedure for this experiment followed that of 
the second experiment.  Participants were exposed only to  experiential  purchases 
and were assigned to one of three between-subjects condition (control, memory cue 
and elaboration).  Individuals in the control  condition (no memory cue) chose one 
experience (a video clip, a video-game or a song) out of three possible options. Those 
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three options were randomly sampled out of a pool of six options. After consuming 
the  experience,  participants  answered  to  the  same  happiness  scale  employed 
throughout these essays. Participants then proceeded to a seven-minute break. 
Back  from  the  break,  participants  in  this  condition  (no  memory  cue) 
proceeded with the second part of the study and, before they received the first set of 
follow-up questions (7 minutes after the choice), they were instructed to:
Please wait while the system retrieves information necessary for the final 
part of the study.
This message was displayed in the computer monitor for 35 seconds. After 
answering the in-lab set  of  follow-up questions,  participants were debriefed with 
instructions to answer the internet-based set of follow-up questions a day, a week 
and  two  weeks  after  the  lab  session.  Before  answering  each  internet  follow-up 
questionnaire, participants received the following instruction and had to wait for 35 
seconds.
“Please wait while the questions are being retrieved from the servers...”
Individuals in the memory cue condition followed the exact same protocol as 
those  in  the  control  condition.  However,  instead  of  waiting  35  seconds  before 
answering the happiness scale in the in-lab and internet follow-up questionnaires, 
they watched (listened to, or played) a 35 seconds snippet of their experience. These 
35 seconds were the first 35 seconds of the original chosen experience.
Finally,  individuals  in  the  elaboration  condition,  instead  of  waiting  35 
seconds or receiving a 35-second snippet of the chosen experience before answering 
the  follow-up  questions,  had  to  elaborate  about  their  choice.  Specifically, 
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participants in this condition were asked to
“Please  describe  in  three  or  four  sentences  what  you  watched,  played  or 
listened to in the lab [the first part of the study] (the video clip, the song, or 
the video game).”
this  task  was  employed  to  more  accurately  mimic  the  natural  recalling  process 
individuals  go  through  when  remembering  an  experience.  After  describing  their 
chosen  experience,  individuals  in  this  condition  received  the  set  of  dependent 
variables (happiness scale).
In summary, each participant, regardless of the condition she was assigned 
to, chose one experience and consumed it in the first part of the lab session. In the 
second part of the lab session and in every follow-up questionnaire (7 minutes, a 
day, a week and two weeks later), participants had to wait around 35 seconds to 
answer the set of dependent variables. Individuals in the control (no memory cue) 
condition had to wait “until  the questions were retrieved from the server” for 35 
seconds. In the memory cue condition, individuals had to re-experience a 35-second 
snippet  of  their  choice.  Finally,  individuals  in  the  elaboration  condition  had  to 
briefly describe their choice.
STIMULI
This experiment employed one set of experiences (set B). Set B was chosen to 
be  the  target  stimuli  of  this  study  to  maximize  variance  in  my  participants 
responses and to encompass the full range of possible responses (1 through 7, in the 
happiness scale). It is the same “set B” used in my previous experiment two.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Participation rates were 100% for the in-lab portion of the study (right after 
choice and 7 minutes after choice), and decreased to 89.3% a day after, 79.3% a week 
after and to 68.9% two weeks after choice. As with my previous studies, the three 
items of the happiness scale were averaged into a unique happiness measure (α = .
88)
The data was analyzed using the same two-step procedure employed in the 
first two experiments. In the first step, described by equation 2, I regressed the log-
transformed happiness scores onto log-transformed time (in minutes since choice). 
The second step regressed the resulting slopes of the first step onto setpoint (the 
initial measure of happiness) and my memory manipulation (control vs. memory cue 
vs. elaboration) and the interaction between the two terms.
Using planned orthogonal contrast codes,  I  found a significant interaction 
between memory manipulation and setpoint, such that the slopes in the memory cue 
condition  are  significantly  different  from  those  in  the  control  and  elaboration 
conditions (F(1,339) = 4.95, p < .05). However, slopes in the elaboration condition are 
not significantly different from those in the control condition (F(1,339) = 0.14, NS).
Inspection of figures 2.8 (control condition), 2.9 (memory cue condition) and 
2.10  (elaboration  condition)  shows  that  the  pattern  found  in  the  memory  cue 
condition is similar to the one found in the same condition of experiment two. Like in 
experiment two, individuals in the memory cue condition adapt faster than those in 
the control (no memory cue) condition. Figures 2.8 and 2.10 also show that slopes in 
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the control condition follow an almost identical pattern as those in the elaboration 
condition, as also evidenced by the null effect previously reported.
A different set  of  orthogonal contrast codes was used to test  whether the 
elaboration manipulation leads to different slopes than those found in the memory 
cue  condition.  In  fact,  slopes  in  the  memory  cue  condition  (figure  2.9)  are 
significantly  different than those  found in the  elaboration condition (figure  2.10; 
F(1,339) = 4.58, p < .05). Similar to the interaction reported in experiment two, the 
interactions reported here hold significant only for the first three periods (right after 
choice, seven minutes and one day after choice) of the data collection process.
The  results  of  this  experiment  qualify  my findings  from experiment  two. 
Briefly, in experiment two I have found that memory cues lead to faster adaptation, 
when compared to a scenario with no memory cues. This set of effects maps onto the 
distinction between adaptation rates  for  material  and experiential  purchases.  In 
other words, one of the possible drivers of the difference between adaptation rates 
for material and experiential rates might be the tangibility of material purchases 
and consequent ease of recall.
In this experiment I have replicated the findings of experiment two (slopes 
for  the memory cue condition are  marginally  different from those  in the  control 
condition;  F(1,339)  =  2.92,  p  =  .08)  with  a  cleaner  control  condition.  More 
importantly,  I  have  shown  that  a  specific  type  of  recall  is  likely  driving  the 
distinction  between  adaptation  to  material  and  experiential  purchases.  Briefly 
elaborating  on  the  choice  made  in  lab  does  not  seem enough  to  warrant  faster 
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adaptation rates4.  The recall  has  to  involve  some “re-experiencing”  of  the  choice 
made in lab, like in the procedure for the memory cue condition.
This  “re-experiencing”  of  the  choice  is  more  aligned  with  the  nature  of 
material  purchases.  Every  time  consumers  see  or  use  a  product,  they  are  re-
experiencing  the  product.  In  this  sense,  giving  consumers  a  cue  for  the  chosen 
experience  is  likely  to  bring  experiential  purchases  closer  to  material  purchases 
when it comes to adaptation rates.
In  the  last  three  experiments  I  have  shown that  individuals  adapt  more 
slowly to experiential purchases, when compared to material purchases, and that 
this  difference  is  partially  attributed  to  how  individuals  remember  their  past 
purchases. Adaptation to material purchases happens fast likely because they are 
often present and, hence,  memory for this kind of  purchase is bound to be more 
accurate  than  memory  for  experiential  purchases.  I  have  shown  that,  given  a 
memory cue, adaptation happens faster and the pattern of results approaches that of 
material purchases in experiment one.
How  fast  individuals  adapt  to  material  and  experiential  purchases  has 
immediate implications for future choices. Over time, successive purchases can teach 
consumers that the enjoyment of  one specific  type of  purchase lasts  longer than 
others  (i.e.,  that  different  purchases  have  different  adaptation  rates).  This 
knowledge, in turn, is likely to influence future choice. In fact, Wang, Novemsky and 
Dhar  (forthcoming)  and  Nelson  and  Meyvis  (2008)  have  shown that  individuals 
4 A follow-up analyses, testing the effect of intensity of elaboration (measured through the average 
number of words used to elaborate) on the influence of time on happiness (hedonic adaptation) 
failed to provide significant effects F(1,222) = 0, NS.
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make choices of experiences considering the intensity of the experience and how fast 
they will adapt to them.
Wang, Novemsky and Dhar (forthcoming) have also shown that individuals 
hold accurate beliefs about hedonic adaptation to products, but fail  to take those 
beliefs into account when making decisions about different products. I extend this 
question to the domain explored in this dissertation. Do individuals hold accurate 
beliefs  about  adaptation  to  different  purchase  types?  Do  they  predict  faster 
adaptation rates for material purchases? Knowing the answer to those questions will 
help to illuminate the choices individuals make between experiential and material 
purchases. I will address such questions in my next experiment.
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Chapter 2.6: Experiment 4
In this  experiment  I  test  whether  individuals  hold  accurate  beliefs  about 
hedonic  adaptation  to  material  and  experiential  purchases.  Participants  were 
assigned  to  one  of  2  x  2  between  subjects  condition  (experienced  vs.  predicted 
adaptation,  and  material  vs.  experiential  purchases).  Data  for  the  experienced 
adaptation conditions come from experiment one (individuals  in that  experiment 
chose real material and experiential purchases and actually went over the hedonic 
adaptation process, as described in that study).
METHOD
Five hundred twenty five students  from The University of Texas at Austin 
participated  in  this  experiment  in  exchange  for  extra-credit  in  an  introductory 
marketing  course.  Three  hundred  and  thirty  five  students  were  assigned  to  the 
experienced adaptation conditions. Their responses constitute the data set used in 
experiment one. The remaining one hundred and ninety participants were assigned 
to the anticipated adaptation conditions.
Participants in the experienced adaptation conditions followed the method 
described in experiment one. In brief, they were assigned to either a (experienced) 
material  or  an (experienced)  experiential  purchase  condition.  In  both conditions, 
they were given a choice of a purchase (an object for the material purchase and an 
experience  for  the  experiential  purchase  condition)  and  answered  the  same 
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happiness  scale  used  throughout  this  dissertation  immediately  after  the 
consumption, seven minutes, one day, one week and two weeks later.
Students  in  the  anticipated  adaptation  conditions  followed  a  similar 
procedure.  They  were  assigned  to  either  a  material  or  experiential  purchase 
condition. In this anticipated experiential condition, the participants were told that 
they could use three “lab dollars” to purchase one experience from a set of three 
possible options (a video clip, a song, or a video game) to consume (i.e., watch the 
video, listen to the song, or play the video-game) in the lab session. The three items 
presented  to  the  respondents  were  chosen  randomly  from a  pool  of  six  possible 
experiences (two video clips, two songs, and two video-games, and were each priced 
at $3). After the choice task, participants watched the video, listened to the song, or 
played the video-game in the experiential purchase condition. Once the experience 
was  over,  participants  answered  the  same  3-item  happiness  scale  used  in  my 
previous  studies.  Then,  participants  were  instructed  to  predict  how  happy  they 
would  be  seven  minutes,  a  day,  a  week  and  two  weeks  from  that  moment. 
Specifically, they saw the following instructions:
“We are now going to ask you to picture yourself 7 minutes [one day, one 
week, two weeks] from now and to predict how you would feel regarding your 
purchase  of  a  [their  choice].  We are  showing you  the  same questions  we 
showed  you  before  but  we  will  ask  you  to  predict  how  you  would  feel  7 
minutes [one day, one week, two weeks] from now. Your answers may be the 
same or they may be different.”
Individuals  in  the  anticipated  material  condition  went  through  the  same 
procedure.  However,  they  were  given  the  choice  of  an  object,  instead  of  an 
62
experience. They received their chosen product and took it home with them. The 
stimuli  employed in the anticipated material  condition were exactly the same as 
those employed in the experienced material condition (described in experiment one).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Both data sets,  data from experienced material  and experiential  purchase 
conditions from experiment one and the new data from anticipated material and 
experiential  purchase conditions,  were merged into one dataset,  containing 2 x 2 
factors  (experienced  material,  experienced  experiential,  anticipated  material  and 
anticipated experiential purchases). Whereas participation rates in the experienced 
conditions varied from 100% for in-lab collection (immediately after choice and seven 
minutes after choice) to 61.1% for the last follow-up questionnaire (two weeks after 
the in-lab session),  participation rates  for  the  anticipated conditions  were 100%, 
since there were not internet follow-up questionnaires.
Data analysis followed the same steps employed in experiment one. In the 
first step (equation 2), the log-transformed happiness scores were regressed onto the 
log-transformed time in minutes (1,  7,  1440,  10080 and 20160 minutes after the 
choice). 
In  the  next  step,  the  resulting  slopes  from the log(happiness)  =  log(time) 
model were regressed onto the setpoint (the composite happiness scale, measured 
right after choice), type of purchase (material vs. experiential), perspective (whether 
adaptation was experienced or anticipated) and the interaction between those terms. 
63
Equation 5 describes this step.
β1i = β0 + βa x type of purchase + βb x perspective + βc x setpoint + βd x type of purchase x setpoint + βe x type of purchase 
x perspective +βf x setpoint x perspective + βg x type of purchase x perspective x setpoint + error (5)
This model shows a significant main effect of setpoint (F(1,511) = 4.06, p < .
05), which is a proxy for the effect of experience valence. It also shows main effects 
for type of purchase and perspective (F(1,511) = 16.12, p < .01 and F(1,511) = 34.49, 
p < .01 respectively). The two-way interaction between setpoint and perspective is 
significant (F(1,511) = 6.24, p < .05), so is the interaction between type of purchase 
and setpoint (F(1,511) = 12.01, p < .01), replicating the findings of experiment one.
However,  more relevant to  the purpose of  this  study,  this  model  shows a 
marginally significant three-way interaction between setpoint, type of purchase and 
perspective (F(1,511) = 3.36, p = .06). Like in the previous two experiments, this 
interaction is only significant for the first three periods of time (right after choice, 
seven minutes and one day after choice). Figures 2.11 and 2.12 plot this interaction 
for the first three periods of time. The x axis represent log-transformed time (in 
minutes) and the y axis represent log-transformed happiness scores. Once again, for 
ease of interpretation, the model was fitted (Irwin and McClelland 2001) at setpoints 
1 and 7 (“negative” and “positive” purchases respectively). 
Figure 2.11 examines the differences between anticipated (dashed lines) and 
experienced  adaptation  (full  lines)  for  positive  (top  lines,  in  gray)  and  negative 
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purchases (bottom lines, in black), for material purchases. Individuals in my sample 
are  pretty  accurate  when  predicting  adaptation  to  positive  material  purchases 
(F(1,5115)  =  1.43,  NS),  but  inaccurate  when  predicting  adaptation  to  negative 
material purchases (F(1,511) = 11.17, p < .01). In fact,  individuals in my sample 
neglect  adaptation  to  negative  material  purchases  and  predict  sensitization  (a 
negative stimulus becoming even more aversive over time).
Figure  2.12  follows  the  same  format  of  figure  2.11.  It  shows  differences 
between  anticipated  (dashed  lines)  and  experienced  adaptation  (full  lines)  for 
positive  (top  lines,  in  gray)  and  negative  purchases  (bottom lines,  in  black),  for 
experiential  purchases.  Overall,  individuals  overestimate  adaptation  rates  for 
positive experiential rates and expect faster sensitization for negative experiential 
purchases (F(1,511) = 8.16, p < .01 and F(1,511) = 4.22 < .05 respectively).
Interestingly,  individuals are accurate when predicting hedonic adaptation 
to positive material purchases. They also predict faster hedonic adaptation rates, 
when  compared  to  the  actual  rates,  for  positive  experiential  purchases.  Taken 
together,  this set of  results would explain why individuals would chose material 
purchases over experiential purchases, a topic of concern for public policy makers 
and for researchers concerned with the increasing level of materialism in our society 
(Frank 1999; Kasser 2002).
These results are consistent with the overall theme that individuals are not 
accurate  when predicting  adaptation  to  experiences  (Kahneman and Snell  1992; 
5 6 observations were considered outliers following the studentized residuals criterion (Cohen et al. 
2003) and were eliminated from this analysis
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Nelson and Meyvis 2008).  It  is also partially consistent with results from Wang, 
Novemsky  and  Dhar  (forthcoming).  The  authors  have  found  that,  although 
individuals hold accurate beliefs about hedonic adaptation, they do not take them 
into consideration when making decisions.  By bringing attention to  the duration 
(different periods of time) of the experience, individuals become more accurate and, 
then, predict hedonic adaptation rates correctly for different products. This seems to 
be the case for my model, but only for positive experiential purchases. When fitted at 
positive  material  purchases,  predictions  of  hedonic  adaptation  are  relatively 
accurate.
Kahneman  and  Snell  (1992)  have  shown  that  individuals  predict 
sensitization (as opposed to adaptation) to unpleasant stimuli (e.g., to plain yogurt). 
Such pattern of results seems to be present in my model. For both negative material 
and  experiential  purchases,  individuals  in  my  sample  predict  sensitization,  as 
opposed to adaptation.
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Chapter 2.7: General Discussion
In this second essay, I mapped actual hedonic adaptation for material and 
experiential  purchases,  and  found  that  adaptation  happens  more  quickly  for 
material than for experiential purchases. Thus, it is not surprising that experiences 
end up inducing a greater variance in happiness scores. I even showed that, after 
only a day of adaptation, purchases that started at the same level of rated happiness 
had  diverged  enough  to  induce  a  purchase  type  by  valence  interaction  in 
retrospective happiness ratings.
This  second  essay  also  shows  that  differences  in  the  way  material  and 
experiential purchases are recalled might be underscoring the differential in hedonic 
adaptation rates for both purchase types. The fact that experiential purchases are 
intangible and, after their consumption, reside only in our memories makes them 
prone to be remembered inaccurately. As time passes, the momentarily lost luggage, 
the broken door knob at the hotel room, and the smell of freshly cut grass from the 
vacation at the Bahamas slowly fade away and we are left with an overall felling for 
that experience; a summary of the central aspects of the experience (Aaker, Drolet 
and Griffin 2008).  This vagueness and volatility not only make experiences more 
open to positive reinterpretation (Mitchell et al. 1997), but arguably more open to 
distortions in general. Material purchases, on the other hand, are tangible and do 
not  reside exclusively in our memories.  Their  benefits  are usually  manifested in 
their physical representations. There is little room for uncertainty about a product 
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when you are interacting with this product on a daily basis, or when you have access 
to the product and can easily recall its attributes.
My second and third experiments have shown that giving individuals a cue, a 
reminder of their experiences, makes them adapt faster to those experiences than if 
no cues were given. In fact, the pattern of results from the memory cue conditions 
seems  similar  to  those  of  the  material  purchase  condition,  bringing  additional 
support to the argument that memory might be underlying my results from the first 
essay.
Naturally, differences in recall might not be the only explanation for different 
hedonic  adaptation  rates  across  purchase  types.  Other  answers  may  lie  in  the 
human  condition.  The  General  Social  Survey  has  consistently  suggested  that 
marriage  and  family  experiences  increase  happiness  and  the  negatives  of  those 
experiences (divorce, death of a loved one) have the opposite effect (Easterlin 2003). 
In his review of the correlates of happiness, Argyle (1999) finds that positive social 
interaction is  a  major  source  of  happiness;  many  experiential  purchases  involve 
activities with other people, including family. In addition to social interaction, the 
accomplishment of goals and the ability to be lost in a task (Csikszentmihalyi and 
Csikszentmihalyi  1988)  seem  to  be  correlated  with  happiness.  Even  solitary 
experiential  purchases,  such  as  the  purchase  of  an  on-line  game,  allow  for  the 
possibility of this kind of flow. In addition, Argyle (1999) shows in his meta-analysis 
that  exercise  increases  happiness.  Although  it  is  a  less  common  component  of 
experiential  purchases  than  social  interaction  and  active  engagement,  exercise 
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nevertheless may vary by the experiential/material distinction (e.g., walking around 
an amusement park or zoo versus sitting in a car). Thus, positive experiences may 
be correlated with the basics of human happiness, and negative experiences may 
represent  the  thwarting  of  these  basics.  Adaptation  may  be  slower  for  many 
experiences  for  this  reason;  future  research  can  show  whether  experiential 
purchases are a proxy for more fundamental human needs.
Other inherent characteristics of material and experiential purchases might 
be also driving the difference in hedonic adaptation rates. Recently, Redden (2008) 
has shown that individuals satiate more on the aspects they use to categorize an 
episode.  He  found  that  the  specificity  of  a  stimulus  (subcategorization)  makes 
satiation slower. With that, people would be happier over time if  they perceive a 
given  stimulus  as  “one  of  a  kind.”  One  can  easily  make  the  argument  that 
experiences  are  more  unique,  less  likely  to  induce  the  feeling  of  repetition  and, 
hence, less likely to induce satiation. This would explain (at least for the positive 
domain)  why  individuals  would  stay  happier  longer  with  experiences,  when 
compared to an alternative material purchase.
This  second  essay  has  also  brought  evidence  that  individuals  mispredict 
hedonic adaptation for both experiential and material purchases. More specifically, I 
found that  individuals  expect  faster  adaptation  rates  for  experiential  purchases, 
when compared to actual, experienced rates. I also  found that individuals are pretty 
accurate when it comes to positive material purchases and, interestingly, expect the 
opposite  of  hedonic  adaptation  (sensitization)  for  negative  material  purchases. 
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Taken  together,  these  results  might  explain  why  material  purchases  are  often 
chosen to the expense of experiential purchases (Frank 1999).
The  set  of  experiments  reported  in  this  essay  not  only  advances  our 
understanding  on  the  processes  underlying  the  effect  of  purchase  types  on  our 
happiness, but also sheds light on the reasons why individuals adapt more slowly to 
experiential  purchases  and  how  inaccurate  they  are  when  predicting  such 
adaptation. Those findings have implications for policy makers and for the growing 
(Mochon, Norton and Ariely 2008; Nelson and Meyvis 2008; Wang et al. forthcoming) 
but  scarce  experimental  body  of  evidence  on  hedonic  adaptation  (Frederick  and 
Loewenstein 1999). More importantly, this is the first empirical account of hedonic 
adaptation rates for different purchase types (as suggested by Frank 1999) and its 
underlying causes and implications.
Along  with  its  empirical  contributions,  this  essay  sets  forth  interesting 
questions  that  deserve  the  attention  of  future  research.  As  pointed  out  by  the 
general discussion chapter in the first essay, this set of studies did not delve into the 
nuances and fine distinctions between material and experiential purchases. Instead, 
it chose to communicate with previous research on the experience recommendation 
(e.g.,  Scitovsky 1976, Van Boven and Gilovich 2003) and to remain close to what 
consumers call an experiential and a material purchase. A cleaner manipulation of 
the type of purchase distinction requires knowing exactly where the line is drawn 
between  those  two  types  of  purchases  and  I  do  not  have  a  grasp  on  the  one 
characteristic that distinguishes experiential from material purchases.
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Another  intriguing  question  is  related  to  the  fact  that  experiments  two 
through  four  failed  to  account  for  effects  passed  the  one-day-after  follow-up 
measures. As reported in the first experiment, adaptation seems to happen quite 
fast.  Experiments  two,  three  and  four  show that  whatever  effect  of  memory,  or 
perspective, on hedonic adaptation is dimmed after just one day. This might be a 
function  of  my  stimuli.  Future  studies  may  answer  whether  more  involving 
purchases  have  overall  less  steep  adaptation  rates  and,  hence,  individuals  take 
longer to start adapting to them.
Different stimuli may also affect the direction of the results in the memory 
studies (experiments two and three). I have found that memory cues accelerate the 
hedonic  adaptation  process.  However,  other  authors  (e.g.,  Frederick  and 
Loewenstein 1999) would make the case that memory cues can reset the hedonic 
reference point and, consequently, make adaptation slower. At this point, I have no 
theory  underlying  when  each  effect  would  happen,  except  for  a  difference  in 
involvement with the experiential  purchase.  Being reminded of  a nice video you 
watched in-lab might be pleasant, but it might also make you realize it has little to 
do with your happiness in life.  Alternatively, being reminded of a great vacation 
with your family might be pleasant and make you realize how important moments 
like these are. In this last example, the hedonic reference point would be partially 
reset and adaptation would take longer to occur.
This set of studies departs from the assumption that the nature of material 
purchases  will  ensure  more  accurate  recall  for  these  purchases.  It  is  a  sound 
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assumption. An average product is less complex than an average experience. This 
complexity, or lack thereof, along with the tangibility of the product could warrant 
more  accurate  recall.  However,  experiences  can  also  be  more  memorable  than 
material  purchases  (Van  Boven  and  Gilovich  2003).  Therefore,  the  question  of 
whether  recall  of  material  purchases  is,  indeed,  more  accurate  is  an  empirical 
question to be answered in future studies.
Finally, another extension of this essay lies on the effects of anticipation of 
hedonic  adaptation  on  consumer  choice.  I  have  previously  argued  that  the 
misprediction of  hedonic  adaptation rates for  material  and experiential  purchase 
would  normatively  lead  to  a  preference  for  purchases  with  slower  anticipated 
adaptation  rates.  However,  I  have  not  tested  whether  this  anticipation  would 
actually lead to preference and consequent choice. I would expect such effect, based 
on results from previous research (Wang, Novemsky and Dhar forthcoming) that 
point to the fact that, when brought to individuals' attention, hedonic adaptation is 
likely to be incorporated in their decisions.
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FIGURE 1.1: Mean Happiness Rating by Outcome
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FIGURE 1.2: Purchase Type by Outcome Valence by 
Materialism Interaction – Low Materialism
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FIGURE 1.3: Purchase Type by Outcome Valence by 
Materialism Interaction – High Materialism
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FIGURE 1.4: Purchase Type on Happiness Slopes by 
Outcome Valence and Materialism
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FIGURE 2.1: How Different Hedonic Adaptation Rates for 
Material and Experiential Purchases Lead to Different 
Happiness Levels for Material and Experiential Purchases
77
FIGURE 2.2: Happiness with Material Purchases Over Time 
(in minutes)
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FIGURE 2.3: Happiness with Experiential Purchases Over Time 
(in minutes)
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FIGURE 2.4: log(Happiness) by log(Time) – Material 
Purchase Condition
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FIGURE 2.5: log(Happiness) by log(Time) – Experiential 
Purchase Condition
81
FIGURE 2.6: log(Happiness) by log(Time) – Memory Cue 
Condition
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FIGURE 2.7: log(Happiness) by log(Time) – No Memory Cue 
Condition
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FIGURE 2.8: log(Happiness) by log(Time) – Control (No Memory 
Cue) Condition
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FIGURE 2.9: log(Happiness) by log(Time) – Memory Cue 
Condition
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FIGURE 2.10: log(Happiness) by log(Time) – Elaboration 
Condition
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FIGURE 2.11: log(Happiness) by log(Time) – Experienced and 
Anticipated Conditions for Material Purchases
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FIGURE 2.12: log(Happiness) by log(Time) – Experienced and 
Anticipated Conditions for Experienced Purchases
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